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or other purposes. Hawes v. Kansas Farm Bureau, 238 Kan. 404 
(1985). 
32 A model statutory form is typically provided for the 
declaration. See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-28,103.  Also, under 
the common statutory provision, if the declarant is competent, the 
declarant’s express desires, if in conflict with the declaration, 
control. See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-28, 106.  That is an important 
point to clarify for clients. 
33 Counsel should carefully study the state law requirements 
that must be satisfied to trigger the agent’s authority to act under 
the DPAHC, and whether the agent has the authority to invalidate 
a previously existing declaration (Living Will) of the client.  In the 
usual situation, the agent will not have the power to revoke a 
previously existing declaration. That could result in the DPAHC 
being inconsistent with the declaration. In that event, counsel 
should consider advising the client to revoke the declaration. 
34 Thus, a DPAHC is a philosophically neutral document that 
lets the principal decide appropriate medical treatment based on 
the principal’s own value system.  Importantly, language in a 
DPAHC could be included that would trigger the agent’s authority 
to act on a medical finding that the principal’s death is imminent 
and that the continuation of artificial means of life support (with 
nutrition and hydration specifically not defined as artificial life 
support) would only prolong the principal’s inevitable death. 
35 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES

by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr 
ANIMALS 
CATTLE. The plaintiff owned an irrigated corn field which 
adjoined the defendant’s land. The properties were separated by a 
“lawful fence” and a one-wire electric fence; however, the 
defendant’s cattle broke through the fence and spread out over the 
irrigated field which had immature corn growing on it at the time. 
Although the defendant agreed to pay for the damage to the crop, 
a fertilizer tank and the loss of fertilizer, the parties disagreed as to 
the measure of damages. The plaintiff argued that the damages 
were calculated by comparing the yield of the non-damaged crops 
and the yield of the damaged area. The plaintiff harvested the areas 
separately and measured the difference in yield to support its 
damage claim. The trial court allowed the plaintiff damages only 
for the cost of rent of a pasture for one day because it found that 
the plaintiff failed to prove the loss of value of the crop on the day 
the damage occurred, not later when the crop was harvested. The 
appellate court held that the proper measure of damages was the 
difference in yield reduced by any reduced costs.  Because the 
plaintiff continued to irrigate, fertilize and harvest the entire field, 
the costs were not reduced by the damage; therefore, the damages 
were equal to the loss of yield in the damaged field. Harsh v. 
Cure Feeders, LLC, 2005 Colo. App. LEXIS 842 (Colo. Ct. App. 
2005).
   FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL 
PROGRAMS 
CROP INSURANCE. The plaintiffs were Texas, Georgia, 
Alabama, Florida, and South Carolina peanut farmers who insured 
their 20 01-2002 peanut crops under Multiple Peril Crop 
Insurance (“MPCI”) policies. The plaintiffs’ crops suffered 
weather-related damage in 2002 and the plaintiffs filed insurance 
claims for the losses. The loss claims were allowed using the 
non-quota peanut per-pound coverage rate of $0.1775 as provided 
under the 2002 Farm Security and Rural Investment Act, Pub. 
L. No. 107-171, 116 Stat. 182 (2002). The 2002 removed the 
distinction between quota and non-quota peanuts and set the rate 
at $0.1775 per pound. The plaintiffs sued in the Court of Federal 
Claims for breach of contract in that the insurance policies were 
formed when the coverage rate for quota peanuts was $0.31 per 
pound. The court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and 
refused to transfer the case to the Federal District Court. The 
plaintiffs argued that the Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction 
under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), because the suit 
did not name the FCIC as a defendant. The court rejected this 
argument because the FCIC was the true defendant in this case 
because the crop insurance policies are between the FCIC and 
the plaintiffs. However, the court held that the case should have 
been transferred to the Federal District Court because the failure 
to transfer caused the loss of the claims due to a statute of 
limitations and because the transfer would not prejudice any party 
or unduly burden the courts. Texas Peanut Farmers v. United 
States, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 9881 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
IRRADIATION OF FRUITS AND VEGETABLES. The 
APHIS has issued proposed regulations to revise the approved 
doses for irradiation treatment of imported fruits and vegetables. 
This proposed regulations establish a new minimum generic dose 
of irradiation for most arthropod plant pests, establish a new 
minimum generic dose for the fruit fly family, reduce the 
minimum dose of irradiation for some specific fruit fly species, 
and add nine pests to the list of pests for which irradiation is an 
approved treatment. In addition, the proposed regulations provide 
for the irradiation of fruits and vegetables moved interstate from 
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Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands at the pest-
specific irradiation doses that are now approved for imported 
fruits and vegetables. The proposed regulations add irradiation 
as a treatment for bananas from Hawaii and to add vapor-heat 
treatment as an optional treatment for sweet potatoes from 
Hawaii. 70 Fed. Reg. 33857 (June 10, 2005). 
PINE SHOOT BEETLE. The APHIS has issued proposed 
regulations which amend the pine shoot beetle regulations to 
allow pine bark products to be moved interstate from 
quarantined areas during the shoot feeding stage (July 1 
through October 31) of the pine shoot beetle’s life cycle 
without treatment. The proposed regulations also establish a 
management method to allow pine bark products to be moved 
interstate from quarantined areas during the overwintering 
stage (November 1 through March 31) and spring flight stage 
(April 1 through June 30) of the pine shoot beetle’s life cycle. 
70 Fed. Reg. 32733 (June 6, 2005). 
PLANT QUARANTINE. The APHIS has adopted as final 
regulations amending the plant health regulations by adding 
to 7 CFR Part 305 treatment schedules and related 
requirements that now appear in the Plant Protection and 
Quarantine Treatment Manual and by removing the Plant 
Protection and Quarantine Treatment Manual from the list of 
material that is incorporated by reference into the regulations. 
70 Fed. Reg. 33263 (June 7, 2005).
   FEDERAL ESTATE 
AND GIFT TAXATION 
DISCLAIMERS. The decedent owned an interest in an IRA 
which had the surviving spouse as the primary survivor 
beneficiary, a marital trust for the surviving spouse as the 
secondary beneficiary and a family trust, with the spouse as 
trustee, as the third beneficiary. The surviving spouse filed a 
timely written disclaimer of an undivided fractional interest 
in the IRA, a written disclaimer of the IRA property passing 
to the marital trust and a written disclaimer of the surviving 
spouse’s limited power of appointment over the IRA property 
passing to the family trust. The IRS ruled that the disclaimers 
were all valid and effective. The IRS also ruled that the family 
trust would be considered a “see-through trust” under Treas. 
Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-4 and the required minimum distributions 
would be determined using the life expectancy of the surviving 
spouse. Ltr. Rul. 200522012, Feb. 14, 2005. 
FAMILY-OWNED BUSINESS DEDUCTION. The 
decedent’s estate consisted primarily of real estate used in a 
family-owned business. The estate hired a CPA to prepare the 
estate tax return and the CPA determined that the estate was 
not eligible for the FOBD and did not make the deduction 
election on the filed return. However, on examination of the 
filed return, it was determined that the estate was eligible for 
FOBD and the estate sought an extension of time to file the 
election. The IRS granted the extension. Ltr. Rul. 200521001, 
Feb. 2, 2005. 
INSTALLMENT PAYMENT OF ESTATE TAX. The 
decedent and spouse owned several residential and commercial 
rental properties and managed the properties with the help of 20 
employees. The properties were owned by wholly-owned LLCs. 
After the decedent’s death the properties were managed by the 
surviving spouse and the employees. The IRS ruled that the 
decedent’s interests in the rental properties were interests in a 
closely-held business for purposes of I.R.C. § 6166 and the 
decedent’s estate could elect to pay the estate tax attributable to 
the properties in installments.  Ltr. Rul. 200521014, Feb. 17, 
2005. 
TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED INTERESTS. The 
decedent had owned several commercial properties when placed 
under a guardianship. The guardian and the decedent’s heirs 
agreed to an estate plan for the decedent and the commercial 
properties were transferred to family limited partnerships with 
various heirs as partners and the decedent as general and limited 
partner. The estate plan provided for gifts of the decedent’s 
partnership interests up to the annual exclusion amount. The court 
found that the parties had an agreement that all of the income 
from the partnerships would be available to the decedent during 
life; therefore, the decedent retained a right to the income from 
the partnerships and the partnerships were included in the 
decedent’s estate under I.R.C. § 2036, except to the extent the 
decedent received money from the partnerships in exchange for 
the property transferred to the partnerships. Estate of Abraham 
v. Comm’r, 2005-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,502 (1st Cir. 
2005), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 2004-39. 
The decedent had owned a condominium as a residence and 
entered into an agreement with the decedent’s eight children that 
the decedent would transfer the condominium to the children 
with the understanding that the decedent would be able to 
continue to use the condominium as the taxpayer’s residence 
without interference from the children. The agreement provided 
that the taxpayer would continue to be responsible for the costs 
of the condominium, including mortgage payments, taxes, 
association fees and maintenance. The decedent transferred 
interests in the condominium to the children in the three years 
before the decedent’s death.  The court held that the value of the 
condominium was included in the decedent’s estate under I.R.C. 
§ 2036(a)(1) because the decedent retained possession and 
enjoyment of the condominium after the transfers were made. 
Tehan v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2005-18. 
The decedent had owned a substantial amount of stock in two 
corporations and transferred the stock to two Delaware business 
trusts (DBTs).  The court held that the stock was not included in 
the decedent’s gross estate because the transfer was considered 
a bona fide sale for adequate consideration because (1) the stock 
was actually transferred to the DBTs; (2) the assets of the DBTs 
were not commingled with the decedent’s personal assets; (3) 
the decedent had sufficient other assets to maintain the decedent’s 
lifestyle; (4) the DBTs were formed by arm’s-length negotiations; 
(5) the decedent’s share of the DBTs were proportionate to the 
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value of the stock; and (6) the formation of the DBTs furthered 
the decedent’s goal to hold the stock for long-term investment, 
a sufficient non-tax purpose. Estate of Schutt v. Comm’r, 
T.C. Memo. 2005-126. 
VALUATION OF STOCK. The IRS has announced its 
nonacquiescence in the following decision: The decedent 
owned a 49 percent interest in a corporation which operated a 
hair salon products business under the decedent’s name. The 
Tax Court had valued the full company at fair market value 
with a discount for the loss of the decedent to the company. 
The Tax Court also discounted the value of the stock by 35 
percent for a minority interest and lack of marketability. Finally, 
the Tax Court discounted the value of the stock by 15 percent 
because of a pending lawsuit. The appellate court reversed, 
holding that the Tax Court failed to provide sufficient support 
for the valuations and discounts applied in that the Tax Court 
did not require the IRS to prove its valuation. In the 
nonacquiescence, the IRS asserted that its valuation was entitled 
to a presumption of correctness.  Estate of Mitchell v. Comm’r, 
250 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 2001), rev’g in part , T.C. Memo. 
1997-461, nonacq., AOD 2005-01. 
FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION 
AUDITS. The IRS has issued an audit technique guide for 
examinations of veterinary practice businesses. The guide 
gives a description of the practice of veterinary medicine, 
industry tax issues, examination techniques, and a number of 
exhibits that list supporting laws, industry organizations and 
web sites of interest. MSSP Veterinary Audit Technique 
Guide (04-2005), IRPO ¶ 219,101. 
The IRS has issued an audit technique guide for 
examinations of partnerships. MSSP Audit Techniques 
Guide: Partnerships (Revised 12/2004). 
BUSINESS ENTERTAINMENT EXPENSES. The IRS 
has issued guidance on the personal use of business aircraft 
for entertainment travel. The guidance explains how to apply 
the limitation under I.R.C. § 274(e) on the amount that a 
business can deduct when a company officer, director, or more 
than 10 percent owner uses the company’s aircraft for 
entertainment travel. The statutory limitation restricts the 
amount that a business can deduct to the amount that the 
employee/recipient actually takes into income for use of the 
aircraft. The notice clarifies who is covered by the limitation, 
describes the relevant costs and illustrates the allocation of 
the costs for an entertainment flight. Notice 2005-45, I.R.B. 
2005-24. 
BUSINESS LOSSES. The taxpayer was a corporation 
which operated an automobile dealership. The corporation was 
wholly-owned by one person who decided to expand the 
business to include classic vintage cars. The cars were 
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purchased and restored to mint condition before being offered 
for sale. The taxpayer advertised the cars for sale and displayed 
the cars in vintage car shows and competitions. The taxpayer 
claimed the income from the cars as ordinary income and losses 
from the car sales as ordinary losses. The IRS argued that the 
cars were purchased as investments with only capital losses 
allowable. The court used the factors of Willford v. Comm’r, 
T.C. Memo. 1992-450 to hold that the taxpayers held the cars 
for sale in the ordinary course of business and was entitled to 
deduct the losses as ordinary losses (1) the sales of the cars 
were as frequent as reasonably to be expected for the classic 
sales market; (2) most of the profits came from the restoration 
of the cars and not from mere appreciation over time; (3) the 
cars were not held by the taxpayer for a time longer than 
reasonably expected for the sales; (4) the taxpayer purchased 
the cars with the intent to resell them; (5) the taxpayer spent 
substantial effort to advertise and market the cars; and (6) the 
taxpayer spent substantial amount of time to the selling of the 
cars. David Taylor Enterprises, Inc. & Subsidiaries v. 
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2005-127. 
CHARITABLE DEDUCTIONS. The IRS has issued interim 
guidance on the deductibility and substantiation requirements 
relating to charitable contributions of qualifying vehicles. No 
charitable deduction is allowed under I.R.C. § 170(a) for the 
contribution of a qualified vehicle with a claimed value in excess 
of $500 unless the donor substantiates the contribution by 
contemporaneous written acknowledgment. Generally, the 
deduction for donated vehicles is limited, with certain 
exceptions, to the actual sale price of the vehicle when it is sold 
by the charity. The new guidance adds another exception to this 
rule, allowing the donor to claim a fair market value (FMV) 
deduction in cases where the charity either gives or sells the 
vehicle at a low price to a needy individual, provided this transfer 
furthers the charity’s purpose of helping a poor person in need 
of a means of transportation. Furthermore, guidance is provided 
with respect to determining FMV and the timelines for 
substantiation of such a charitable contribution. This interim 
guidance applies to contributions made on or after January 1, 
2005, and until regulations become effective. Notice 2005-44, 
I.R.B. 2005-25. 
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. The taxpayers filed 
for Chapter 7 bankruptcy with the estate consisting of a business 
debt owed to the taxpayer and two properties secured by 
mortgages. After the bankruptcy filing, the business debt became 
worthless, the automatic stay was lifted as to the two properties 
and the properties were sold for less than the lenders’ claims. 
The lenders did not file a claim for the deficiencies in the 
bankruptcy case. The taxpayer did not include the discharged 
deficiencies in income but claimed a net operating loss from the 
worthless business debt. The court held that the deficiencies 
were discharged in the bankruptcy case, resulting in income to 
the taxpayer which offset the net operating loss from the 
worthless business debt. The appellate court affirmed in an 
opinion designated as not for publication. Johnson v. Comm’r, 
2005-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,396 (5th Cir. 2005), aff’g, 
T.C. Memo. 2004-37. 
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IRA. The taxpayer had an IRA with a bank and received an 
early distribution from that IRA. The taxpayer attempted to 
reinvest the funds in three other IRA accounts but the new 
trustee failed to properly establish the IRAs; thus, the funds 
were placed in ordinary savings accounts. The error was not 
discovered until more than 60 days had passed since the initial 
distribution and the taxpayer requested a waiver of the 60 day 
rollover period. The IRS granted the request. Ltr. Rul. 
200521033, Feb. 14, 2005; Ltr. Rul. 200521034, March 4, 
2005. 
The taxpayer was married and filed a joint return with the 
spouse. The taxpayer was a participant in an employer-
sponsored retirement plan and also made contributions to an 
IRA. Because the taxpayer was a participant in a retirement 
plan, the IRS contribution deduction was subject to reduction 
by the amount of the taxpayer’s gross income over $53,000, 
I.R.C. § 219(g)(2)(A), (3)(B)(i). The taxpayer deducted the 
contribution to the IRA based on the taxpayer’s calculation of 
the limitation on the IRS deduction using only taxpayer’s 
individual gross income of $61,000 and not the combined gross 
incomes of the taxpayer and spouse of $124,000. The court 
held that the calculation of the limitation on IRA contribution 
deductions had to be made with the combined gross income 
of the taxpayer and spouse since they filed a joint return. Ho 
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2005-133. 
INSTALLMENT METHOD OF REPORTING. The 
taxpayer was an S corporation which sold property under an 
installment agreement. The taxpayer hired an accounting firm 
to prepare the income tax returns. The accounting firm 
determined that the sale was not eligible for installment 
reporting of the gain and filed the return with all the gain 
reported as current income. The taxpayer hired another 
accounting firm which reviewed the return and determined that 
the transaction was eligible for installment reporting. The 
taxpayer sought permission to revoke the election out of the 
installment method of reporting the gain from the sale. The 
IRS granted permission to revoke the election. Ltr. Rul. 
200521007, Feb. 25, 2005. 
INTEREST RATE. The IRS has announced that, for the 
period July 1, 2005 through September 30, 2005, the interest 
rate paid on tax overpayments continues to be 6 percent (5 
percent in the case of a corporation) and for underpayments 
continues to be 6 percent. The interest rate for underpayments 
by large corporations continues to be 8 percent. The 
overpayment rate for the portion of a corporate overpayment 
exceeding $10,000 continues to be 3.5 percent. Rev. Rul. 2005­
35, I.R.B. 2005-24. 
LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES. A testamentary trust 
exchanged property intended to qualify as a like-kind exchange 
for purposes of I.R.C. § 1031; however, under the terms of 
the trust, the trust was scheduled to terminate within a short 
period after the exchange and distribute its property to the 
beneficiaries. The IRS ruled that the pre-determined 
termination of the trust did not affect the eligibility of the 
exchange for Section 1031 like-kind exchange treatment. Ltr. 
Rul. 200521002, Feb. 24, 2005. 
PARTNERSHIPS 
CLASSIFICATION. The taxpayer was the sole owner of a 
limited liability company which operated a nursing home. The 
company did not make the election to be taxed as a corporation 
under the “check-the-box” regulations, Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701­
1 through 3. The IRS levied against the taxpayer’s property to 
collect employment taxes owed by the company. The taxpayer 
argued that the levy was improper because the taxes were owed 
by the company and not the taxpayer.  The taxpayer argued that 
the “check-the-box” regulations were invalid because they 
exceed the statutory authority of the IRS. The court held that 
the regulations were a valid interpretation of the statute and 
provided taxpayers with beneficial flexibility in determining the 
taxation of their small companies. The court held that the 
taxpayer was personally liable for the company’s employment 
taxes since the taxpayer did not elect to have the LLC taxed as a 
corporation. Littriello v. United States, 2005-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 
(CCH) ¶ 50,385 (W.D. Ky. 2005). 
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in June 2005 for 
purposes of determining the full funding limitation under I.R.C. 
§ 412(c)(7), the corporate bond weighted average is 5.94 percent 
with the permissible range of 5.35 to 5.94 percent (90 to 100 
percent permissible range). The 30-year Treasury securities rate 
for this period is 5.00 percent, the 90 percent to 105 percent 
permissible range is 4.50 percent to 5.25 percent, and the 90 
percent to 110 percent permissible range is 4.50 percent to 5.50 
percent. Notice 2005-46, I.R.B. 2005-24. 
S CORPORATIONS 
SHAREHOLDER. The taxpayer had purchased a 50 percent 
share in an S corporation but decided to sell the shares to the 
other shareholder in 2001. The other shareholder failed to obtain 
a loan for the buyout but the taxpayer ceased all activities with 
the corporation or its business. In October 2001, the parties 
reached an agreement for the sale of the shares and the taxpayer 
received a partial payment in cash with the remainder to be 
paid as soon as financing was arranged. In 2002, the taxpayer 
agreed to a smaller lump sum payment. The taxpayer did not 
include any share of the corporation’s income for 2001, although 
the corporation filed a Form K-1 allocating 50 percent of the 
corporation’s 2001 income to the taxpayer.  The taxpayer argued 
that the taxpayer’s share was terminated in April 2001 when 
the taxpayer ceased activities with the corporation and agreed 
to sell the shares to the other shareholder.  The court held that 
the best evidence that the taxpayer’s interest in the corporation 
ceased was the October 2001 sales agreement and payment of 
the cash; therefore, the taxpayer’s share of corporation income 
for the first 10 months of 2001 was included in the taxpayer’s 
income for 2001. Mullins v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 
2005-72. 
TRAVEL EXPENSES. The taxpayer was a self-employed 
computer consultant who owned a residence in Colorado. During 
the tax year involved, the taxpayer was hired by a company in 
Australia to perform temporary computer consulting activities. 
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The taxpayer contracted with a property management company 
to rent the Colorado residence while the taxpayer lived and 
worked in Australia. The court held that the taxpayer failed to 
establish that the business had a permanent home in Colorado; 
therefore, the taxpayer “carried” the taxpayer’s residence to 
Australia and could not deduct travel expenses to and from 
Australia. Verity v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2005-70.
 NEGLIGENCE 
DAMAGES. The plaintiff farmer ordered the same corn seed 
from the defendant as was purchased in the previous year but the 
delivered seed was of a shorter harvest period than the previous 
seed. The plaintiff discovered the error because the new seed was 
planted next to seed saved from the previous year. The plaintiff 
notified the defendant when the new crop tassled much earlier 
than expected and the defendant told the plaintiff to harvest the 
corn and the defendant would “settle” the problem at harvest. 
The plaintiff sued for the lost production because the shorter period 
corn was not suitable for use in the area. The plaintiff claimed 
damages based on the total production for the new and old seed 
as compared to the previous year when all old seed was used. 
The defendant argued that the damages should have been 
calculated using only the comparison of the production of the 
defective seed, and, because the plaintiff failed to segregate the 
harvested corn, the damages were not proved by the plaintiff. The 
court upheld the jury award of damages based on the total 
production comparison because the defendant never required the 
plaintiff to separate the harvested corn. Matt v.Agro Distribution, 
LLC, 2005 La. App. LEXIS 1428 (La. Ct. App. 2005). 
OPEN AND OBVIOUS DANGER. The plaintiff’s son was 
killed while assisting the defendant in repairing the front-end 
loader on a tractor owned by the plaintiff.  The defendant was 
using the tractor on the defendant’s property when the accident 
occurred. The plaintiff sued for ordinary negligence and premises 
liability. The defendant argued that the defendant’s liability was 
precluded by the open and obvious danger of repairing the front-
end loader.  The court held that the doctrine of open and obvious 
dangers did not apply to ordinary negligence claims but did apply 
to premises liability claims. The trial court had granted summary 
judgment to the defendant based on the son’s knowledge of farm 
machinery and the danger of repairing a front-end loader while 
it was raised. The court held that the trial court applied the wrong 
standard as to the knowledge of the danger, holding that the court 
should have used the knowledge of a “reasonably prudent 
person” as to the dangers and not the plaintiff’s son’s knowledge. 
Laier v. Kitchen, 2005 Mich. App. LEXIS 1274 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 2005).
   SECURED TRANSACTIONS 
LEASE VERSUS SALE. The parties entered into two nearly 
identical “leases” of dairy cows. The first lease involved 122 
cows and the second 90 cows. Each lease provided for a term 
of 50 months with two regular monthly lease payments, two 
small monthly lease payments, and 46 regular monthly lease 
payments. The leases allowed the lessee to purchase the leased 
cows for approximately three lease payments. The leases 
required the lessee to replace any lost cows and the lease covered 
any offspring of the original cows. The court stated that U.C.C. 
§ 1-201(37) as enacted in Illinois and Kansas, created a per se 
sale rule if (1) the lease cannot be terminated by the lessee and 
(2) the leased property can be purchased for a nominal price. 
Both parties agreed that the leases did not allow the lessee to 
terminate the leases, but the parties disagreed as to whether the 
option to purchase price was nominal. The court found that the 
option purchase price was nominal because the price was about 
6 percent of the total lease payments, the lessee was required to 
replace lost animals and the offspring became leased property. 
The court stated that “only a fool” would fail to exercise the 
purchase option after spending so much on the cows and lose 
the benefit of new offspring and replacement cows.  The court 
also cited the factors of (1) the lessee was required to bear all 
maintenance costs, including insurance, taxes, and veterinary 
care and (2) the cattle did not initially belong to the lessor but 
were purchased from a third party. In re Buehne, 321 B.R. 239 
(Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2005). 
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